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Abstract 
 
This paper outlines the process for evaluating the economic effects of Gunns proposed pulp 
mill in northern Tasmania. Removal of the project from the Resource planning and 
Development Commission had two important effects. First, assumptions underlying the 
proponent’s impact statement could not be tested in public hearings. Second, important parts 
of the RPDC economic assessment criteria were never addressed. In the end, the review 
process was structured so that only one outcome, favourable to the proponents, was ever 
possible.  
1 
Introduction 
 
Speaking in support of the Pulp Mill Permit on 30 August 2007, Legislative Councillor Mr 
Jim Wilkinson concluded that ‘I am satisfied that the pulp mill proposal has been assessed 
against the guidelines established by the RPDC and against the conditions that were imposed 
by various regulators according to the law’. Some seven weeks earlier the economic 
consulting firm ITS Global had completed its review of the social and economic benefits of 
the mill. It is clear from the Hansard record of the debate that many Councillors relied on the 
conclusions of this review in supporting the granting of a permit for the mill, but it is a matter 
of speculation as to whether Councillors other than Mr Wilkinson believed that the RPDC 
guidelines had been met. The review by ITS Global, however, leaves no doubt as to its 
position – it noted that since Gunns had withdrawn from the RPDC assessment process, the 
guidelines for the draft IIS were ‘defunct’1.  
 
For the Lennon government it was self-evident that the large investment associated with the 
mill would benefit Tasmanians. In 2004, well before any formal assessment process had 
begun, Economic Development Minister Lara Giddings said that  
 
‘There are clear benefits for Tasmania in developing a pulp mill. The benefits can be 
measured in terms of jobs and economic growth through the downstream processing of 
our timber resource and we are determined to do all we can to see a modern pulp mill 
facility using world’s best practice in Tasmania.’2  
 
The government was true to its word. Significant funds from Commonwealth and State 
governments were spent to facilitate development of the mill proposal and to persuade 
Tasmanians of its merits. The Tasmanian government lobbied for continuation of tax 
concessions under managed investment schemes so as to ensure the financial viability of the 
mill and, after the mill permit was legislated by the Tasmanian parliament, for 
Commonwealth infrastructure funding for transportation of pulpwood around the state.  
 
The effect of withdrawing the mill from the RPDC assessment process was that these and 
other expenditures or tax concessions, together with possible externality costs, were never 
quantified by either the proponents or reviewers of the IIS. This made it inevitable that the 
assessment process would find ‘clear economic and social benefits’ from building the mill.  
 
The focus of this paper is on the adequacy of the economic assessment of the pulp mill project 
– both through the RPDC process and the subsequent ITS Global review commissioned by the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet. The story begins with an outline of the RPDC 
assessment criteria, followed by a section illustrating the pro-mill environment of political 
spin in which the assessment took place. I then analyse the assessment process in two stages. 
The first stage comprises three sections which examine the economic modelling strategy 
underpinning Gunns’ IIS, the welfare measures derived from it, and whether the IIS met the 
RPDC guidelines. The second stage deals with events after submission of the IIS – the peer 
review reports of the IIS, the ITS Global review, and the modelling conducted by the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research.   
 
It is just possible that, had a more critical assessment been completed, a broad consensus 
might have been reached in which a formal benefit-cost analysis showed the mill to be of net 
benefit to the residents of Tasmania. This is not what happened. The last section of the 
chapter concludes that, at the time Mr Wilkinson spoke, the economic assessment of the pulp 
mill was incomplete in a number of important respects – consideration of subsidies for the 
                                                 
1 ITS Global (2007), p.8. 
2 Press release by Minister Lara Giddings announcing the establishment of the Pulp Mill Task Force, 
18 August 2004.  
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mill had been sidelined; important modelling assumptions had not been scrutinised; the 
possible cost of environmental externalities had been excluded; and benefits accruing to 
Tasmanian households had been misrepresented.  
 
RPDC Assessment Criteria 
 
The role of economic assessment in approving major developments appears to be 
straightforward – evaluate social benefits and social costs and, if the latter exceeds the former, 
approve the project. Practical implementation of this assessment is, however, always 
contentious and no more so than in evaluation of Gunns’ pulp mill proposal.  
 
A number of issues make assessment problematic. Which costs and benefits are relevant? 
How should they be measured? Who bears the costs and who enjoys the benefits? Who 
scrutinises claims made by proponents and opponents?  
 
Final Scope Guidelines produced by the RPDC in December 2005, address the first two of 
these questions. Section 2.1 specifies that the introductory section of the IIS     
 
‘... should describe the pulp mill in the context of international pulp import and export 
markets and the predicted benefits and costs of the pulp mill with respect to Tasmania 
and Australia. Provide a descriptive and quantitative analysis of the benefits and costs 
of the pulp mill, including but not necessarily limited to, an assessment of the pulp mill 
impacts on the Australian balance of trade and associated services and markets. This 
should include a summary of overall conclusions of the net pulp mill impacts based on 
environmental, social, economic and community costs and benefits.’3  
 
while Section 8.4 requires the proponent to detail  
 
‘… any government supplied benefits that have or will be supplied to the proponent to 
make the project viable or reduce its risk exposure (including direct government 
financial or infrastructure contributions, or tax concessions). The proponent should 
take account of the timing of payments and costs, including the costs of additional 
monitoring to all levels of government over the life of the project and anticipated 
contributions. Any anticipated forms of public subsidy, both direct and indirect, shall 
be identified and described. Any costs to be borne by public expenditure for the 
management of social, environmental and economic impacts of the pulp mill project 
should be individually detailed’.4  
  
The third question on distributional issues is sidestepped by implicit use of the so-called 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion in welfare economics, whereby a project is approved if the aggregate 
benefits exceed the aggregate costs. This amounts to the requirement that the benefits should 
be large enough that those that benefit could, in theory, compensate those that bear the costs. 
Precisely how this is to be achieved is left unspecified but the political process has a role to 
play. Private remedies may also be available if the losers to access the legal system to enforce 
compensation for damages should they occur, although there is some uncertainty as to 
whether this course is ruled out by s.11 of the PMAA .  
Procedures for projects of State Significance address the fourth question. Under these 
procedures, there are four opportunities for review of the proponents’ draft IIS against the 
                                                 
3 RPDC Final Scope Guidelines, December 2005, p.8. This section is unclear as to the relevant 
constituency – is it Tasmanians, or Australians? This is important because, as is detailed subsequently, 
most of the economic impacts modelled in Gunns IIS derive from a diversion of resources from 
mainland Australia to Tasmania.    
4 RPDC Final Scope Guidelines, December 2005, p.64-65.  
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RPDC guidelines – peer review reports on the IIS initiated by the RPDC; submissions and 
hearings on the IIS; submissions and hearings on the RPDC’s draft assessment report; and 
approval of both the Tasmanian Premier and the Australian Government Minister for 
Environment and Heritage.  
Spin 
 
Assessment of the mill was accompanied by a drumbeat of overblown claims as to the 
importance of forestry in the Tasmanian economy. Lobbyists such as the Construction, 
Manufacturing, Forestry and Engineering Union (CMFEU) and Timber Communities 
Tasmania, a lobby group largely funded by the forestry industry, lost no opportunity to argue 
that forestry underpinned growth in the Tasmanian economy while simultaneously stressing 
the need for government handouts to sustain further growth.  
 
Given their constituency, such behaviour is understandable and appears to have been 
successful. In 2007, for example, 24% of survey respondents thought that forestry had ‘made 
the greatest contribution to the growth of Tasmania’s economy in the last few years’ – second 
only in importance to tourism.5 It is hard to reconcile this response with the reality that 
Tasmanian woodchip exports had declined since 2000, and forest contractors had, in 2007, 
asked the Commonwealth for a $93m package to help them exit the industry.6  
 
While it might be difficult for the general public to discount repeated but erroneous claims, 
more is expected from the responsible ministers. But Bryan Green, then Minister for 
Infrastructure, Energy and Resources, was infected by the lobbyists’ enthusiasm for forestry 
and wood products industry. For example, in his submission to the Australian Government’s 
review of taxation treatment of plantation forestry, he claimed that ‘these industries contribute 
... 23 % of Gross State Product ... and directly employ around 10,700 people (1 in 13 
workforce participants)’.7  
 
These claims, which appear to have been sourced from a CFMEU website, were wildly 
inflated. Schirmer (2008) estimated employment in the forestry and wood products industry to 
have been 6300 in 2005-06 which, given the Tasmanian workforce of 222,000 persons, is 
2.9% of the total. That is, the industry employed one in 35 workers, not one in 13 as claimed 
by Minister Green. Data on value added in the forestry and wood products industry are not 
compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, but even in the unlikely event that workers in 
the industry were twice as productive as the Tasmanian average, their contribution to Gross 
State Product would have been 5.8%, not 23% as claimed by Minister Green.  
 
The same attitude prevailed in characterising the results of the IIS. Consider three examples, 
one from Gunns’ advertising, and two from responsible ministers.  
 
The Gunns example is taken from a series of advertisements during the 2007 federal election 
campaign, one of which made the claim that the mill ‘will provide government with an extra 
$1 billion in revenue to fund health, education and other community services’.8  This claim is 
worth analysing at some length, as it is misleading in several important respects.  
 
                                                 
5 Enterprise Marketing & Research Services Pty Ltd (2007). 
6 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (2007).  
7 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (2005), p.2. 
8 Gunns Limited (2007), ‘Inconvenient facts the Greens will not discuss’, The Mercury, p.10, 7 
November. 
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The CoPS model results are that the mill generates an increase in tax revenues for all levels of 
government with a discounted present value of $834m9. Perhaps it was just a rhetorical 
flourish by Gunns to ‘round up’ to the nearest billion dollars, but there are other difficulties.  
 
The first is that while IIS tabulates revenues (other than income taxes) generated in Tasmania 
as State government revenue most of these revenues accrue, in the first instance, to the 
Commonwealth government; only $170m are State and local government taxes. The CoPS 
modelling logic, however, is based on marginal rather than average effects. This means that 
treating GST revenues generated in Tasmania, as a State tax overstates the allocation of GST 
revenues that Tasmania would receive consequent on the construction of the mill. The 
Commonwealth Grants Commission allocates Australian GST revenues to the states in a 
complicated way, but the essential point is that the process generates a proportion – in its 
most recent allocation, Tasmania received around 3.6% of the total – which is used to 
calculate GST revenue shares. Applying the marginal logic of CoPS modelling, therefore, 
Tasmania could expect to receive 3.6% of the total change in Australian GST revenues.  
 
Using year-2030 figures from the IIS as an example, GST collected in Tasmania is estimated 
to rise by $28.7m, while for Australia as a whole, the increase is $19.7m.  Assuming 
unchanged Grants Commission proportions, therefore, the increase in GST revenue which 
Tasmania could expect to receive in year 2030 would be 3.6% of $19.7m, or less than $1m, 
not the $28.7m figure tabulated in the IIS. Although the same Grants Commission formula 
does not apply to Commonwealth income taxes, the same general argument applies. So a 
more realistic interpretation of the CoPS results is that the present value of tax revenues 
accruing to local and State governments in Tasmania is of the order of $200m, not $1000m, as 
claimed by Gunns.  
 
Unfortunately, the confusion does not end there. Both the IIS (and the subsequent ITS Global 
review) overlook one of the modelling assumptions of the CoPS model, which is that 
government expenditures are held fixed and the budget balance is unchanged. This 
assumption is implemented by the modelling requirement that all tax revenues are given back 
to households as a lump-sum transfer who, in turn, spend the transfer in the same way as other 
components of household disposable income. So, in the IIS, there are no tax revenues 
available to be spent on ‘health, education and other community services’.     
 
Having considered the Gunns example of spin at some length, turn now to two other 
examples, from Treasure Aird and Premier Lennon.  
 
Answering a question from the Legislative Council member for Rumney on 19 April 2007, 
Treasurer Michael Aird heralded an era of supercharged growth for Tasmania, claiming that 
  
‘…. if the pulp mill is developed, it will give a lift to the economy of 2.5 % growth 
every year.  When you consider we have around 3.5 % growth now, the 2.5 % 
growth that can be achieved by building the pulp mill will give a huge lift to the 
general wellbeing of the State. … It is not quite a doubling but it is still quite an 
impressive figure and it would be a sustainable figure right through.’10 
 
This answer is highly misleading as it suggests that the mill would lead to a sustained annual 
growth rate of around 6 %. As will be described in more detail in the next section, IIS 
modelling does not report annual growth rates of Gross State Product (GSP). What it does is 
                                                 
9 In the IIS discounted present values apply to the relevant annual flows from 2007 to 2030,  expressed 
in constant prices; a discount rate of 5% is used.   
10 Legislative Council Hansard, 19 April 2007. 
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/HansardCouncil/isysquery/a034df15-27d1-4cf0-9669-
0336f97a8104/10/doc/ 
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to calculate the difference in the level of GSP with and without the mill. The pitfalls of Mr 
Aird’s analysis are easily demonstrated over the three-year construction period by taking his 
assumption of 3.5% annual growth without the mill, together with the IIS results for the effect 
of the mill on the level of GSP. Combining these two sets of numbers and expressing the 
resulting aggregate as a year-on-year percentage change gives the following sequence of 
growth rates: 2007: 4.86%, 2008: 4.91%, 2009: 2.90%11. In terms of year-on-year growth 
rates, the 6 % figure is never reached and in 2009 the year-on-year growth rate is, 
inconveniently, lower than the ‘without-the-mill’ growth rate of 3.5 %.    
 
Premier Lennon tried a different approach to spruiking the benefits of the mill. In April 2007 
he wrote to the Tasmanian public with the claim that the mill would mean ‘an extra $870 
each year for every Tasmanian household.’12 The derivation of this figure was never 
revealed but the public required no coaching to recognise the implication of the Premier’s 
claim – that all Tasmanian households would get an equal share of the spoils – was nonsense.   
 
Did the IIS address the RPDC Guidelines?  
 
The RPDC guidelines did not require Gunns to undertake a formal cost-benefit analysis. 
Rather, section 8.4 requires that any past, present or anticipated public-supplied benefits, 
together with costs of environmental monitoring and management, should be enumerated.   
 
Readers of section 8.4 of the RPDC guidelines might reasonably have concluded, for 
example, that tax benefits such as those provided by managed investment schemes (MIS) fall 
within the ambit of the IIS in the sense that they provided ‘benefits to make the project viable 
or reduce its risk exposure’.13 It also appears that governments and industry implicitly agreed 
with this position. Consider the following: 
 
• In 2005 the Tasmanian Government argued for continuation of MIS schemes because  
  
‘The Tasmanian government is concerned that a policy change by the Australian 
Government could undermine investment decisions and jeopardise crucial investments. 
For example, if a policy change resulted in a significant reduction in plantation 
development in Tasmania, the outcome could place at risk the proposed Gunns pulp 
mill …’14 
 
• Recording the favourable outcome of the inquiry into MIS schemes, the Commonwealth 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests noted that 
 
‘A number of planned key project proposals, valued at several billion dollars, depend 
directly on further expansion of the MIS plantation sector. They include the Gunns 
pulp mill in Tasmania, the Protavia pulp mill at Penola in the Green Triangle, 
                                                 
11 If the level of GSP is given a base-period value of 100 in 2006, a 3.5% growth rate for the following 
three years gives values of 103.5, 107.12 and 110.87. The IIS reports (Table C1, p.56) that these three 
values will be higher by 1.32%, 2.71%, and 2.12% respectively, giving a ‘with the mill’ sequence of 
GSP levels over the three years of 104.86, 110.03 and 113.22. Year-on-year percentage changes based 
on this sequence give the numbers cited in the text.    
12 Lennon (2007).  
13 Although the following discussion is focussed on managed investment schemes, Round Table for 
Sustainable Industry (2007) identified a number of other areas involving significant government 
subsidy.   
14 Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources (2005), p.2. 
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expansion of the Visy pulp mill at Tumut in NSW and the PaperlinX pulp mill upgrade 
at Maryvale in Victoria.’15  
 
• This outcome was enthusiastically endorsed by Gunns who noted that  
 
‘The industry has lobbied tirelessly to ensure that the government fully understands the 
significant benefits of the expanding forest industry to regional and rural Australia. 
Over $4 billion worth of value-adding processing plants are being planned or 
developed in regional areas around Australia on the back of MIS funded plantations 
including Gunns Ltd’s $1.4 billion pulp mill at Bell Bay.’16  
 
The IIS response to the RPDC requirement in section 8.4 was, however, brief. While 
acknowledging that ‘Gunns has also benefited from Commonwealth Government R&D 
support with respect to the project, and the Commonwealth Government’s Managed 
Investment Scheme’17, and that the company had ‘been in discussions with Governments with 
respect to support for common user, public benefit infrastructure aspects of the project’ these 
benefits were not quantified or included in formal modelling because ‘nothing had been 
contracted with the Tasmanian or Commonwealth Governments’18. 
  
Were it to rely on contracts with individual taxpayers the Australian tax system, of which the 
tax rules for MIS schemes are a part, would be unique. In any event, the IIS apparently had no 
difficulty in modelling tax payments generated by the project, so is difficult to see why the 
same exactitude could not have been applied to benefits received from the government.  
 
Perhaps the IIS omission of subsidy calculations relied, instead, on the argument that MIS and 
TCFA benefits were available to Gunns Ltd and the forestry industry, but not contingent on 
construction of the pulp mill. But again it is difficult to see how Section 8.4 restricts attention 
to contingent forms of assistance.  
 
Treasury (2007) was also keen to avoid any quantitative estimates of subsidies to Gunns, and 
hence the pulp mill. To achieve this outcome, its advice to Minister Turnbull had it both 
ways.19 On one hand it argued that only costs and subsidies contingent on construction of the 
pulp mill should be counted – or in other words the ‘avoidable cost’ logic of cost-benefit 
analysis, rather than the approach outlined in the section 8.4 of the RPDC guidelines – should 
apply. On the other hand, the same document argues that it was not possible to conduct a cost 
benefit analysis of the mill and that attention should focus on the viability of the mill – with 
the implication that section 8.4 should apply.  
 
The CoPS model and Gunns IIS 
 
Now turn to a description of the model used for the economic impact study included in Gunns 
IIS.20 Known as the Monash Multi Regional Forecasting (MMRF) model, it is one of a 
number of models developed over the last 25 years by the Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) at 
Monash University. During that time, CoPS has earned a strong international reputation in the 
area of computable general equilibrium modelling.    
 
                                                 
15 Taken from ‘Forestlinks’, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests, August 2007 (emphasis 
added).  
16 Gunns Annual Report, 2006-07 and Gunns Plantations Limited, Newsletter, Spring 2006.  
17 IIS, p.33. 
18 IIS, p.33 
19 Department of Treasury and Finance (2007). 
20 In this chapter, ‘IIS’ refers to the MMRF model-based report prepared for Gunns by the Allen 
Consulting Group (2006).  
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Tools of the CoPS kind comprise a large set of computer-coded algebraic equations which 
represents demands and supplies of both goods and services and labour for industries, 
households and the government, and the way in which these evolve over time. These models 
have undoubted strengths because they attempt to calculate impacts of major projects or 
policy changes in a consistent way – for example, the enforcement of budget and resource 
constraints ensures there is no double counting of costs and benefits. They offer a 
considerable advance over older input-output models because they incorporate the adjustment 
of firms and households to changes in relative prices, rates of return and incomes21. 
Nevertheless, it is important to ask whether the structure of the model, and the way in which 
the specific project was modelled, captured all the important economic aspects of the mill, 
and whether the model outputs met the RPDC guidelines.  
 
The CoPS model describes22 
  
• the output, demand for intermediate inputs, employment, and capital investment decisions 
of competitive firms. Firms are differentiated by industry (54 in CoPS-Green) and 
produce differentiated products (58). Each industry is disaggregated by State (8) and sub-
State region (56); 
• the spending and saving decisions of households. There is a single ‘representative’ 
household in each State, so the model is not intended to analyse income-distribution 
issues;  
• the spending, taxation and budget balances of State and Federal governments; 
• the response of real wages to deviations from the long run equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, and the determination of rates of return in the 54 industries in each State. 
Changes to these prices induce movements of labour between industries and/or States, 
and induce changes in the rate of investment in the State-specific industries. While 
productive capital equipment and agricultural land are assumed to be industry-specific, 
the model does not differentiate between different skill or occupational classifications of 
labour.  
• international exports and imports of the 58 products (differentiated by State), together 
with the income flows consequent on changes in borrowing from abroad. 
• the evolution over time of output, the stock of productive capital, and employment in each 
industry. 
 
Modelling of this kind is computing- and data-intensive, and for users not familiar with the 
underlying specification it tends to be something of a ‘black box’ with heavy reliance placed 
on the good reputation of the CoPS modelling program. Basing an impact assessment on the 
CoPS model however, does not immunise users against the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ problem, 
or ensure that model outputs are interpreted in a useful way.  
 
The starting point for the IIS is to transform the business plan for the mill into a time profile 
of industry and State-specific demands for additional capital investment, employment and for 
the outputs of other industries23. In turn, these changes to the input variables lead to changes 
in the output variables – model outputs represent the induced changes to the ‘no pulp mill’ or 
baseline case, which is typically a neutral scenario in which all industries and regions are 
growing at their long-run equilibrium rates. 
 
                                                 
21 It is now generally recognised that the older input-output approach to impact assessment tends to 
overstate the impact of new projects because it ignores the relevant resource and budget constraints, 
and so ignores the response to consequent changes in relative prices and rates of return.   
22 Parmenter et. al. (2001) and IIS, Appendix B provide more detailed descriptions of the MMRF 
model.  
23 See IIS, p.18. The business plan was not a public document. It does not appear to have been 
scrutinised in the peer review or the ITS Global report.  
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Now consider the changes that take place in the pulp mill case. In the first instance, increased 
demand for capital and labour needed to construct and operate the pulp mill is met by 
increased labour supply (in response to a higher real wage); increased supply of goods with 
which to produce the required capital equipment; and increased borrowing from abroad 
(which appreciates the real exchange rate). 
 
These changes have knock-on effects to households, government, and to other industries. For 
example, appreciation of the exchange rate reduces profitability in industries exposed to 
international competition. Similarly, the rise in the real wage reduces profitability in labour-
intensive industries. These ‘crowding out’ effects mean that, over time, a significant impact of 
the pulp mill is to attract resources away from other industries and/or States.   
 
In the long run, this reallocation effect is almost the whole of the story as far as labour is 
concerned, because the long run equilibrium of the model is one in which total Australian 
employment reverts towards its baseline level. Employment in Tasmania rises, largely as a 
result of migration from the mainland – in the long run, the IIS model solution implies that 84 
% of the increase in Tasmanian employment is satisfied by interstate migration24. Australian 
GDP is higher, however, because there is more installed capital in the long run. But the 
reallocation story is important here too. The entire rise in production occurs in Tasmania – by 
2030 real Tasmanian Gross State Product is $675.8m higher than in the baseline, but in the 
rest of Australia, real GDP is $351.6m lower.                
 
The Welfare Measure derived from the CoPS model  
 
While the CoPS model provides a wealth of detail regarding the induced effects on various 
industries and regions, the bottom line in the impact assessment is ‘are Tasmanian households 
better off’? The IIS welfare measure is based on the change in aggregate private consumption 
expenditure, and the IIS results indicate that in the long run this aggregate is 2.49 % higher in 
the ‘with the mill’ simulation than in the baseline case. However, many economists would 
argue that 
 
• Government consumption expenditures yield private consumption benefits. In other 
words, publicly-provided consumption goods are a close substitute for some categories of 
private consumption expenditure. For example private health expenditures are a close 
substitute for publicly-provided health services; public and private expenditures on schools 
are close substitutes, and so on. So if an aggregate consumption measure is to be used to 
gauge welfare effects, it should be based on a measure which includes both welfare-enhancing 
components of consumption, rather than just private consumption expenditure by households.  
• Per capita measures are a more relevant basis for welfare measurement than state-wide 
aggregates.  
 
To calculate the impact of these two points, it is necessary to estimate the change in welfare-
enhancing consumption and population from their baseline levels.  
 
Consider the change in welfare-enhancing consumption first. Conservatively, assume half of 
general government consumption expenditure yields private consumption benefits. Then, 
based on national account data for 2005/06, private final consumption expenditure in is 85% 
of welfare-enhancing consumption.   
 
The IIS assumes that there is no change to real government consumption expenditure, and IIS 
(Table C.1) indicates that in 2030 real private consumption expenditure is 2.49% higher than 
it otherwise would be, so the increase in welfare-enhancing consumption is 85% of this 
figure. 
                                                 
24 IIS, Table C2, p.56. 
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Now consider the change in population, which is related to the number of persons migrating 
from the mainland to Tasmania. In the CoPS model, the basic measure of the quantity of 
labour demanded is total hours worked. Other important quantities such as household 
disposable income (which determines the demand for housing, for example), are based on a 
measure of wage income which is, in turn, calculated by multiplying ‘hours worked’ by the 
hourly wage. While this might be regarded as a deficiency of the model, employment in terms 
of persons is essentially a memo item, albeit one which turns out to be important in discussing 
per capita measures of welfare. The average employment impact in the operating phase 
(2007-2030) is an increase in the number of hours of 2.0% over what it otherwise would be. 
The IIS assumes that of this increase in total hours worked, 0.7% is satisfied by an increase in 
the number of persons employed, and the remainder by an increase in the numbers of hours 
per worker.  
 
This assumption is contentious. There may well be an increase in working hours during a 
period of intensive construction activity, but it is highly unlikely that this would be sustained 
in the long run, at least at a significant state-wide level. So a reasonable alternative 
assumption is that in the long run employment increases by the same proportion as the 
increase in hours.  
 
Although the change in State population is not reported in the IIS it is reasonable to assume 
that by 2030 the State population will increase by roughly the same proportion as the increase 
in employment satisfied by interstate migration which, from the IIS, Table C.2, can be 
calculated as 84% of the total increase in Tasmanian employment in 2030.  
 
Although both assumptions – the change in State population and the extent to which 
government consumption expenditure yield private consumption benefits – seem reasonable, 
they could be challenged. Using the CoPS model assumption as to the increase in 
employment numbers, the long-run change in per capita consumption is 1.5%; on a more 
reasonable long-run assumption, the per capita consumption benefit is just 0.43% higher than 
it would have been without the mill.   
 
Peer Review 
 
The peer review of the economic component of the IIS was undertaken by ACIL Tasman as a 
sub-contractor to Beca AMEC Limited. The ACIL Tasman report endorses the CoPS model 
as being appropriate for an impact assessment of this kind and, while it appears not to have 
scrutinised the underlying commercial-in-confidence project parameters, is generally 
supportive of the modelling assumptions. However, it notes that, while not likely to be 
sufficiently important to change to overall positive impact assessment provided by the IIS,   
‘The model could have been extended to include at least one alternative discount rate 
and alternative assumptions about renewable energy credits. These would have 
reduced the size of the estimated impacts but in ACIL Tasman’s judgement they still 
would have been positive. The analysis could also have been extended to cover 
evaluations of environmental externalities (after allowing for their mitigation).’25  
The first of the three issues noted above – the choice of discount rate – is often a 
contentious part of cost-benefit evaluation. The discount rate does not alter the actual 
stream of costs and benefits generated by the model – rather, it is important because 
any welfare evaluation needs to calculate the net present value, or the difference 
between the present value of the stream of benefits and costs. If costs are incurred early 
                                                 
25 Beca AMEC Limited (2006), p222. 
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in the life of the project, and benefits accrue later, it is possible for changes in the 
discount rate to change net present value from being positive to negative. Such a 
change would change the decision whether to accept or reject the project.   
The discount rate is less important in an assessment of the kind included in the IIS, 
however, because it is not a cost-benefit study. All that is involved in the IIS is the 
present value of a sequence of positive numbers such as the model’s solution for the 
annual increases in consumption expenditures. So, while different discount rates yield 
different present values, the present value will remain positive regardless of the choice 
of discount rate, and this is essentially the conclusion of the ITS Global review.   
The second two points are not so easily dismissed. An important component of the mill is the 
plant generating electricity from biomass which, under the Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target (MRET) scheme, is assumed to attract revenue from the sale of renewable energy 
certificates. The IIS estimates the impact of these sales on Gunns profits to be more than 
$33m per annum in real terms26. However as in the case of MIS schemes (which both the IIS 
and ITS Global excluded from consideration), MRET revenues are not subject to a contractual 
agreement with government. So the peer-review suggestion that the IIS results be evaluated 
against alternative assumptions for renewable energy certificates is important. It is not, 
however, even mentioned in the ITS Global review.  
 
The third point is concerned with the economic evaluation of environmental externalities. 
This issue has been central to the public debate. For various reasons it has never been allowed 
to intrude into economic assessment process for the mill. In his expert witness statement to 
the RPDC Mr Jon Stanford, the Allen Consulting economist for the IIS, wrote 
 
‘We did not model the economic impact of any significant adverse environmental 
impacts because we were not advised that there would be any such impacts.’27 
 
For the Tasmanian Treasury, the rationale for exclusion was different. Their argument, 
provided in a letter to Malcolm Turnbull, then Commonwealth Minister for the Environment 
and Water Resources, was that  
 
‘A formal cost:benefit analysis cannot be done for a major industrial project; that is, a 
quantification of all the externality costs and benefits to obtain a net present value of the 
project. Rather, assessment processes identify the major economic, environmental and social 
impacts of the project and if, the overall assessment is that the project is viable, the regulatory 
regime is then prepared to address potential risk and externality costs’.28   
 
This position is at odds with best practice elsewhere, as various applied studies attest. A 
decision to allow private-sector construction of a nuclear power plant is a familiar classroom 
example. In that case environmental externalities are a central part of the economic impact 
assessment, and must be included in a formal cost-benefit study. Kennedy (2007) provides a 
recent example of this type of analysis in the UK. A second example is provided by the cost-
benefit analysis of the Gordon-below-Franklin dam which, far from being too difficult, is 
used as a case study in the Commonwealth’s Handbook of Cost-Benefit Analysis.29 
 
                                                 
26 This is a significant component of profits from the mill. The IIS assumes the $1.45b mill is debt-
financed. The real interest rate assumed in the IIS is not reported, but assuming it is, say, 5%, the 
modelled real interest cost is $72.5m per annum. In other words, the assumed receipts from the sale of 
energy certificates cover around half the estimated interest cost.   
27 Stanford (2006), p.14.  
28 Department of Treasury and Finance (2007), p.6.  
29 Department of Finance and Administration (2006), ch.8. 
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A major problem with the Treasury position is that ‘viability’ (whether from the perspective 
of the private-sector proponent or society as a whole) is not independent of the costs of the 
regulatory regime. At the time of writing, for example, construction can proceed but 
operation of the mill is subject to Commonwealth approval for effluent disposal. If the 
Commonwealth minister assesses environmental externalities to be sufficiently large the 
regulatory regime may, in the end, require installation of a tertiary treatment plant costing 
several hundred million dollars. In that event, the Treasury position is silent as to who should 
bear this cost – is it the regulator or the proponent? If it is the latter, is the project still 
privately viable?    
 
The ITS Global report  
 
Following its withdrawal from the RPDC process, Premier Lennon decided that the 
assessment of the economic and social benefits of the mill pulp mill could be outsourced to a 
consultant. Whatever the merits of the argument regarding cost-benefit analysis, the brief 
prepared by the Department of Premier and Cabinet foreclosed the issue by omitting any 
reference to environmental issues. ITS Global, a firm specialising in international trade 
strategy, were awarded the $270,980 contract and in line with the brief, note that their report 
is not a cost-benefit analysis and that it does not assess any environmental issues30.  
 
The ITS Global consulting brief required it to review the project and to report on whether it 
would result in a net social and economic benefit for Tasmania. It was required to take into 
account materials provided to the RPDC by Gunns, the public and government agencies, as 
well as a CoPS study of an earlier mill proposal. It was left open to ITS Global to propose and 
conduct any additional research for the review. In the event, the review did not incorporate 
any additional research. As noted earlier, issues raised in the ACIL Tasman peer review were 
left to one side31.   
 
Issues raised in public submissions were similarly glossed over. One of these concerned risk. 
Edwards (2007), for example, argued that volatility in the world price for pulp exposed the 
Tasmanian economy to a degree of volatility (through Forestry wood supply contracts and 
other interactions between the mill and the wider economy) that should be considered in the 
assessment. Others argued that the assumptions in the Jaakko Pöyry business plan for the mill 
should be subject to a sensitivity analysis.  
On the latter point, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which assumptions made by 
consultants, using essentially the same model, can lead to radically different outcomes. A 
graphic illustration is provided by comparing two assessments of Gunns pulp mill – the 
Centre of Policy Studies (CoPS) report prepared for the Tasmanian Treasury in 2004, and the 
Gunns IIS report, also based on the CoPS model, but prepared 18 months later.  Both these 
reports analyse the impact of a pulp mill on the Bell Bay site, with construction spread over a 
three year period (2005 to 2007 in the first case, and 2007 to 2009 in the second).  The three-
year sequences of construction costs are given in the first row of Table 1, and model-
generated outcomes for the change in Tasmanian consumption, investment and employment 
are given in the next three rows.   
 
 
                                                 
30 ITS Global (2007), p.8. 
31 Although not available to ITS Global at the time, the review prepared for the Commonwealth 
Minister for the Environment and Water Resources also raised ‘a number of areas of potential concern 
regarding robustness of the results’, some of which had been highlighted in public submissions. See 
Department of the Environment and Water Resources (2007).  
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Table 1 Construction-period impacts from two studies based on the CoPS model. 
 Treasury report Gunns IIS report 
 2005 2006 2007 2007 2008 2009
Construction Investment ($m) 100 500 400 435 870 145 
Real Consumption ($m) 202 1052.3 468.4 105.9 231.5 162.1
Real Investment ($m) 254.4 1198.1 697.6 509.5 1066.9 285.7
Employment (thousand persons) 1.7 8.4 2.1 1.7 3.4 1.4 
Source: Centre of Policy Studies (2004), Table 2; IIS (2006), Table C2
Note: Data for the CoPS study are expressed in 2001 prices; data for the IIS study are 
expressed in 2005 prices. 
 
 
The construction-cost profiles differ slightly in the two reports, and so some differences in 
model outcomes can be expected. The model-generated outcomes are, however, significantly 
different32. Compare these results over the three-year construction period: 
 
• In the first report, a cumulative investment of $1b generates a cumulative increase in 
consumption of more than $1.7b; in the second report, a cumulative investment of $1.45b 
generates a cumulative increase in consumption of just $0.5b. In other words the 
‘consumption multiplier’ in the first report is five times as large as in the second.  
• In the first report, the $1b investment generates a peak-period increase of 8.4 thousand 
jobs; in the second report, with a larger investment, the peak-period increase in 
employment is 3.4 thousand jobs. The employment multiplier is three and half times as 
large in the first report as in the second.  
• In the first report the induced increases in consumption and investment are roughly the 
same; in the second report the investment response is up to five times as large as for 
consumption.  
 
Clearly, these differences are large, and one might have expected the assessment process to 
provide an explanation as to how the CoPS model could generate such markedly different 
results. ITS Global took both studies into account, as required by the consulting brief. In a 
116-page report, its comparative analysis of the two studies is recorded in a single sentence, 
noting that  
 
‘Although the two assessments used somewhat different assumptions – notably for the 
timing and length of the assessment period as well as the construction and operating 
costs of the mill – they obtained broadly similar results.’33 
  
 A common tactic adopted by the government boosters of the mill was to dismiss the 
arguments of the sceptics, on the grounds that they were based on uncertain or speculative 
data. No doubt claims made by the sceptics were subject to uncertainty, but the boosters’ 
tactic glossed over the uncomfortable reality that the same applies to CoPS results. This 
uncertainty, or risk, is of two types – what I will describe as ‘model’ uncertainty and 
‘assumption’ uncertainty.  
Consider model uncertainty first.  The CoPS model is credible, well-documented, and is 
widely used in impact assessment. However it is based on estimates of a very large number of 
parameters, each of which is subject to its own uncertainty. It is standard practice in 
econometrics, and recommended practice in cost-benefit studies and business planning, to 
                                                 
32 Table 1 provides comparative results over the three-year construction period. However, the long-run 
results are also markedly different. For example in the 2004 study the long-run percentage increase in 
consumption is twice as large as the long run increase in Gross State Product; in the 2006 study, these 
two variables increase by virtually the same percentage.  
33 ITS Global (2007), p23, emphasis added. 
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recognise this uncertainty by presenting results as lying within upper and lower confidence 
limits34. In realistic applications these calculations can be complex but are nevertheless 
essential if users are to judge the degree of uncertainty around model outputs, and to judge 
how uncertainty about particular parameters, which may be important in specific applications, 
affects the overall result.35 It is not yet standard practice in CoPS modelling, but the 
methodology for applying this approach analytically was developed twenty years ago; with 
the development of more powerful computers similar results can be obtained using Monte 
Carlo techniques.36 In the absence of this information the IIS must be regarded as providing 
‘best estimate’ outputs from the CoPS model, but users are given no guidance as to the width 
of the confidence bands surrounding these estimates.  
Now turn to ‘assumption uncertainty’. This relates to the assumptions which must, of 
necessity, be made about inputs into the model. In preparing the IIS, analysts will have made 
a number of these, including assumptions  
• required to translate the business plan for the mill, prepared by Jaakko Pöyry, into a form 
which can be represented in terms of variables in the model,  
• about external conditions such as the world real interest rate, world prices and demand for 
paper pulp and woodchips, and the distribution of profits from the mill,  
• about the proportion of the construction workforce initially located in Tasmania, and the 
proportion satisfied by migration, 
• as to how much of the labour input is satisfied by an increase in hours, and how much is 
satisfied by an increase in the number of people employed. 
Many of these assumptions involve uncertainty. The job of the analyst is to make judgements 
about the most likely outcomes, and to present them in a transparent way. The point is not to 
criticise the fact that one has to make assumptions in order to generate solutions from CoPS-
type models – that is an inevitable part of the analysis. The issue is, rather, that a review of the 
IIS might reasonably have been expected to provide some assessment of whether the 
assumptions were reasonable and the sensitivity of model results to changes in assumptions.  
I have discussed the ITS Global review at some length because it was, in a sense, a substitute 
for the public hearings which would have taken place had the RPDC process been adhered to. 
Although the reviewer was able to enquire into the underlying modelling assumptions, or to 
propose that additional research be carried out, it did not do so. Instead, the review amounted 
to little more than a summary of public submissions to the RPDC and a lengthy restatement of 
the conclusions drawn by the IIS. Inevitably, given that the IIS is not a cost-benefit analysis, it 
came to the conclusion that the net benefits of the project were positive.   
 
National Institute Review 
 
Legislation for the pulp mill permit had passed the Tasmanian parliament by August 2007, 
and Commonwealth minister Turnbull had given conditional approval for the mill in the last 
weeks of the 2007 federal election campaign. So the report of the National Institute of 
                                                 
34 See for example, ch.9 of Campbell and Brown (2003), which is a standard reference on cost-benefit 
analysis.  
35 An everyday example might help to illustrate the point. Suppose I go to the hardware store to buy 
paint, but I am uncertain both as to the dimensions of the area to be painted and the porosity of the 
surface, which determines the required number of coats of paint. Although the calculation is 
straightforward the number of tins to buy is uncertain. If I am sure I need only two coats, it is 
uncertainty as to the area that matters; but if I measured the area exactly the purchase is only sensitive 
to the assumed number of coats.  
36 See Pagan and Shannon (1985, 1987).  
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Economic and Social Research, which appeared in January 2008, was too late to have much 
impact on the debate.  
 
The model on which this report is based is not as well documented (at least in the public 
domain) as the CoPS model on which the IIS and ITS Global reports are based. So it is 
difficult to make an assessment as to the reliability of the results, which showed no net 
benefits from the pulp mill. However, the model is notable for its attempt to include, in a 
probabilistic way, costs of adverse external outcomes identified by Edwards (2007) and the 
Round Table for Sustainable Industry (2007) that were not included in these earlier studies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
From the time of Lara Giddings’ launch of the pulp mill task force in August 2004 the IIS, the 
peer reviews and the ITS Global report all failed to quantify any costs or subsidies associated 
with the viability of the mill, monitoring of outcomes, or consequential infrastructure costs. 
Similarly, these reports were unable to quantify a single dollar of prospective externality 
costs.   
 
By fast-tracking the process and excluding considerations detailed in section 8.4 of the RPDC 
assessment guidelines, the government promoted an assessment methodology which could 
produce only one result – that the mill would increase household consumption spending and 
gross state product. The only question of interest was the size of these effects. But even with 
this blinkered approach, which puts the economic outcomes in the best possible light, the 
benefits were meagre. Drawing on the analysis of this paper, results reported in the IIS 
suggest that welfare-enhancing per capita consumption was likely to be less than half a 
percentage point higher than it would have been without the mill.  
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